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ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW: THE MEANING
OF "RELATE TO" IN SECTION 514
In response to a growing national concern about the loss of private
pension benefits resulting from financial difficulties of employers and
job mobility of employees,' Congress enacted the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 The Act governs two
types of "employee benefit plans"3: (1) "employee pension benefit
plans," which provide retirement or deferred income to employees; 4
and (2) "employee welfare benefit plans," which provide fringe benefits
such as medical and life insurance to plan participants.'
. In 1962 President Kennedy created a task force to study the effect of loss of employee
pension benefits on employees in the private sector and on the nation's economy generally. 120
CONG. REc. 29934 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits); S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4843. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, THE
FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 5-8, 51-140 (1964) (detailed analysis of private pension plans'
inadequacies). The task force recommended federal legislation requiring minimum vesting stan-
dards and fiduciary safeguards. 120 CONG. REC. 29934 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4838, 4843. No legislative action resulted immediately, but in 1967 Senator
Javits introduced a private pension reform bill. 120 CONG. REc. 29934 (1974). Other senators
and congressmen followed with their own proposals.
The Senate approved its version of ERISA on September 19, 1973, and the House passed its
version on February 28, 1974. 119 CONG. REC. 30428 (1973); 120 CONG. REC. 4782 (1974). A
conference committee resolved discrepancies and both houses accepted the conferees' report by
August 22, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 29216, 29963 (1974). President Ford signed the Act into law on
September 2, 1974.
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (nontax provisions codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1381 (1975); provisions defining qualified plans eligible for favorable tax treatment codified prin-
cipally at I.R.C. §§ 401-415).
3. "The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an
employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an
employee pension benefit plan." ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1975).
4. [An employee pension benefit plan] is any plan, fund, or program which was hereto-
fore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organi-
zation, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding
circumstances such plan, fund, or program (A) provides retirement income to employees,
or (B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to termination
of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contribu-
tions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the
method of distributing benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1975).
5. The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund,
or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an em-
ployer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its partici-
pants or their beneficiaries through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
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ERISA does not require employers to adopt either benefit plan or
grant specific benefits or benefit levels for plans they do adopt.6
Rather, the Act seeks to insure that employees do not lose benefits they
have earned through service to their employer by requiring disclosure
and reports from plan managers,7 establishing participation and vesting
standards,' setting minimum funding standards9 and fiduciary guide-
lines for the management of plan funds,' 0 and providing plan insur-
accident, disability, death, or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services,
or
(B) any benefit described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
ERISA § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1975).
6. Because Congress chose to retain a voluntary, private approach to the problem, it could
not impose costly minimum benefit standards without discouraging employers from adopting or
maintaining plans. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4639,4639, 4643; Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974: Policies andProblems, 26 SYRAcusE L. REV. 539, 555-57 (1975).
7. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1975). These requirements apply to both
pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans. Plan Administrators must furnish a plan descrip-
tion and annual report to plan participants, beneficiaries, and the Secretary of Labor. See Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 660-67.
8. ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1975). These standards apply to most pen-
sion benefit plans. Id § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051. The minimum participation standards generally
require that a pension plan include any employee who is twenty-five years of age and who has
completed one year of service. Id § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(l)(A), These standards
also prohibit rejection of employees for being too old, except under certain specified plans. Id
§ 202(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(2).
The Act also provides three alternative vesting formulas. The first possibility allows for a
graded schedule under which the participant becomes twenty-five percent vested after five years
and receives an additional five-percent interest for each of the next five years and an additional
ten percent for each of the remaining five years. Id § 203(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B).
The second alternative offers a ten-year vesting schedule by which the participant is fully vested
after ten years of service. Id § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A). The third alternative,
known as the "rule of 45," provides that a worker with at least five years of service must become
fifty percent vested when the sum of his age and years of service equals forty-five, after which an
additional ten percent must become vested for each of the next five years. Id § 203(a)(2)(C), 29
U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(C).
Finally, the Act limits forfeiture of accrued benefits deriving from employer contributions, Id
§ 206(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(c), and assignment and alienation of benefits, id § 206(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d). See text accompanying note 17 infra.
9. ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1975). Past service liabilities must be amor-
tized over a thirty-year period, and experience losses must be amortized over a fifteen-year period.
Id §§ 302(b)(2)(B)(ii),(iv), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082(b)(2)(B)(ii),(iv), Past service liabilities and exper-
ienced losses of multi-employer plans may be amortized over forty years and twenty years, respec-
tively. Id
10. Id §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114. These guidelines, which apply to both pension
and welfare benefit plans, include: a standard of conduct for plan trustees, id § 404(a)(l)(B), 29
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ance through the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 1
To eliminate state interference with the accomplishment of ERISA's
goals, Congress included in the Act a general12 preemption provision-
section 514-which states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan."' 3 Section 514 has spawned considerable confusion and
litigation over the scope of preemption Congress intended in using the
phrase "relate to" in the section.' 4 Courts have encountered this issue
most often in relation to state laws concerning insurance, 5 domestic
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); a list of prohibited transactions, id § 406,29 U.S.C. § 1106; and an invest-
ment diversification requirement, id § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
11. Id § 4001-4082, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381.
12. The section is general, as opposed to § 206(d), which specifically preempts assignment
and alienation of plan rights otherwise permissible under state property law. The Act does not
mention the connection between § 514 and § 206, but in Francis v. United Technologies Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court recognized one in concluding that ERISA preemption
is virtually total and that "[m]ore specifically" ERISA provides for the restriction of alienation
and assignment in § 206(d). Id at 86.
13. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975). But see id. § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b),
which contains specific exceptions for state regulation of insurance, banking, and securities busi-
nesses and for state criminal law. See also text accompanying notes 24-27 infra. See generally
Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation under EBISA4, 62 IowA L. REv. 57
(1976); Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Regulation by ERS,4, 13 FORUM 652 (1978).
14. See generally Hutchison & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 23 (1978); Comment, Attachment of
Pension Benets Under ERIS.4, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 255 (1979); 78 COLUM. L. RE. 1536 (1978).
Although the courts have focused on the statutory interpretation aspects of the issue, they also
have dealt summarily with constitutional challenges to preemption under § 514.
Preemption opponents argue that if courts interpret the scope of preemption broadly, ERISA
will encroach on constitutional rights of the states or of the individuals harmed by preemption,
despite the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. In making this argument, pre-
emption opponents raise various constitutional issues: protection of residual state sovereignty
under the tenth amendment, see Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a.'d, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D.
Minn. 1976); denial of fifth amendment due process, see Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977) and Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D.
Minn. 1976); unconstitutional vagueness of the phrase "relate to," see Insurer's Action Council,
Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976); denial of equal protection, see id; impairment
of contract, see id; taking without compensation, see Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in
Pensions and Social Security Benefits after Marriage of Brown and ERIS.4, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
417 (1978); and extension of federal power beyond the scope of the commerce clause, see Standard
Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton,
423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976). None of the decisions found a constitutional violation in § 514
or related sections. See generally Okin, supra note 13.
15. For insurance cases supporting a broad interpretation of "relate to," see Wadsworth v.
Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Standard Oil Co. v. Ag-
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relations,16 and civil fights,1 7 but occasionally the question has arisen in
other contexts such as debtor-creditor relations,' 8 taxation,' 9 workers'
compensation,20 professional licensing and regulation,21 and restitu-
tion.22
salud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), af'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). For a narrower inter-
pretation, see Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
16. For domestic relations cases deciding against preemption on the basis of a relatively nar-
row interpretation of "relate to," see A.T. & T. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Senco, Inc.
v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F.
Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stone v.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Marriage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal.
1976); In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1979), apealdocke/ed,
48 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. June 19, 1979) (No. 78-1881); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d
900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978),petiionfor cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1979) (No.
79-1445); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J. Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (Super. Ct. 1978); In re M.H. v. J.H., 93
Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Fain. Ct. 1978). Two other cases have held for preemption.
General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (on basis of § 206);
Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (on basis of broad inter-
pretation of § 514). The following domestic relations cases hold against preemption, but provide
little clarification of the meaning of "relate to": Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d
511, 149 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1978); Western Elec. Co. v. Traphagen, 166 N.J. Super. 418, 400 A.2d 66
(App. Div. 1979); Ellis v. Lionikis, 162 NJ. Super. 579, 394 A.2d 116 (App. Div. 1978); Magrini v.
Magrini, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 398 A.2d 179 (1979).
17. For cases deciding against preemption on the basis of a relatively narrow interpretation
of "relate to," see Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979),peilion
for cert. flied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1979) (No. 79-258); Brown Co. v. Wisconsin Dcp't
of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, No. 77-C-29, slip op. (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 1979); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 68 IlN. App. 3d 829, 386 N.E.2d 599 (1979);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Human Rights App. Bd., 60 A.D.2d 943, 401 N.Y.S.2d 597
(1978); Gast v. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Department of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 87 Wis. 2d 56, 273 N.W.2d 786 (Ct, App.
1978); Time Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor, and Human Relations, 46 U.S.L.W.
2369 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1978). For a broader interpretation, see Perval Indus., Inc. v. Connecticut
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), a 9'd, 603 F.2d
214 (2d Cir. 1979); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., [1975-
1979 Transfer Binder] PaNs. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,622 (D. Mont. Aug. 14, 1978).
18. In re Parker, 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Electrical Workers Local I Credit
Union v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust Fund, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); National
Bank of N. Am. v. Local 3, IBEW, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
19. National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
20. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, aj'd on rehearing, 464 F. Supp.
133 (D.N.J. 1978).
21. Suffolk County Bar Ass'n v. Law Research Serv., Inc., [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] PENS.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1978).
22. Martin v. Hamil, No. 78-C-2643, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1979); Bacon v. Wong, 445 F.
Supp. 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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This Note analyzes the inconsistent judicial interpretations of section
514, proposes a guideline that is sufficiently flexible to reconcile the
cases' conflicting outcomes on the scope of ERISA's preemption of
state law, and examines proposed amendments to section 514 designed
to alleviate some of the problems raised by the preemption decisions.
I. ERISA's GENERAL PREEMPTION PROVISION: SECTION 514
Section 514 generally provides that ERISA shall supersede any state
law that relates to an employee benefit plan.23 Section 514 limits the
scope of preemption,24 however, by exempting25 state laws that regulate
23. (a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect
January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application
(1) This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, or
any act or omission which occurred, before January 1, 1975.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is
not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for
the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan,
shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for pur-
poses of any law or any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contract, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of serv-
ices or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title.
(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal
law of a State.
(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable only
to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law of the United
States.
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency
or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms
and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter.
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or supersedure of
any law of the United States prohibited
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, im-
pair, or supersede any law of the United States (except as provided in section 1031 and
1137 (b) of this title) or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.
ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1975).
24. Id § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). The following subsection, the "deemer
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the insurance, banking, and securities businesses26 and state criminal
laws.27
Section 514 was the result of a conference committee's resolution of
clause," cautions that legitimate employee benefit plans are not deemed to be engaged in the
insurance, banking, or investment businesses. Id § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
25. Id § 514(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
26. Congress may have been concerned about impinging on state sovereignty when it speci-
fied these exceptions. See note 14 supra. The legislative history does not explain these exemp-
tions; the conference committee report merely paraphrases the provision. H. CON. REP. No. 93-
1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5038,
5162. Yet the problems created by preemption in these areas must have been obvious to Congress.
State criminal law is an important complement to ERISA in protecting plan assets from fraud or
misappropriation. Furthermore, preemption of state laws regulating businesses that deal with
benefit plans (I e., by selling them insurance or by handling their investments) would create a void
ERISA cannot fill.
The insurance business provides a concrete example of this problem. After ERISA became
effective, a number of organizations that were actually fronts for insurance businesses purported
to be benefit plans to avoid state regulation; the courts decided, however, that these organizations
were within the insurance business exception. Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency, 567 F.2d
692 (7th Cir. 1977); Business Conf. Employee Benefit Ass'n v. Anderson, 451 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.
Iowa 1977); Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977); Hamberlin
v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977). The courts distinguished insurance busi-
nesses from ERISA plans primarily on three grounds: (1) whether the organization in question
was profit-making; (2) whether it offered coverage indiscriminately, without regard to employer or
type of employment; and (3) whether it came into existence through the efforts of someone other
than covered employees or their employers. See generaly Note, Insurance Regulation-Enployee
Benftt Pans, 28 ARK. L. REV. 515 (1975).
By exempting state insurance law, Congress also followed a longstanding national policy of
state primacy in insurance business regulation. The Supreme Court initially did not consider an
insurance policy to be interstate commerce subject to federal regulation. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1869). In 1944, however, the Court held that the insurance business operates in
interstate commerce. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). To
avoid judicial attack on insurance regulation as a burden on interstate commerce, Congress passed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act the following year. Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 34 (1945). See Brum-
mond, supra note 13, at 79-80.
27. Laws relating to plans that ERISA does not cover, of course, also are exempt. ERISA
§ 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975). ERISA's general coverage sections provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 1051, 1081, and
1101 of this title, this subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is estab-
lished or maintained-
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or
(3) by both;
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discrepancies between earlier House and Senate versions.2 8 The House
proposal29 limited the scope of preemption to state regulation of areas
expressly covered by the bill: reporting, disclosure, fiduciary duties,
funding, financing, vesting, and forfeitability. The Senate proposal"
defined the scope of preemption in more general terms to encompass
laws relating to subject matters governed by the bill or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act.3 ' In both earlier versions, state laws that
related to benefit plans were to be invalid only to the extent they con-
flicted with or duplicated ERISA. The conference version abandoned
"relationship to the Act" as the standard of preemption in favor of a
(b) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if-
(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(32) of this title);
(2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in section 1002(33) of this title) with respect
to which no election has been made under section 410(d) of Title 26;
(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable work-
men's compensation or disability insurance laws;
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the benefit of
persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens; or
(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(36) of this title) and
is unfunded.
Id § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003.
28. See note 1 supra.
29. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1974):
(a) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that, except for actions
authorized by section 503(e)(1)(B) of this Act and except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section the provisions of part I of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the
States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
the reporting and disclosure responsibilites and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons act-
ing on behalf of any employee benefit plan to which part 1 applies.
(c) It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that the provisions of parts
2, 3, and 4 of this subtitle shall supersede any and all laws of the States and of political
subdivsions thereof insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the nonforfeitability of
participant's benefits in employee benefit plans described in section 201(a) or 301(a), the
funding requirement for such plans, the adequacy of financing such plans, portability
requirements for such plans, or the insurance of pension benefits under such plans.
120 CONG. REc. 4742 (1974). See also HousE COMM. ON EDUC. & LAB. REP. No. 93-533, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4655.
30. S. 4200, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973):
(a) PRE-EMPTION OF STATE LAWS-It is hereby declared to be the express intent of
Congress that, except for actions authorized by section 694 of this title, the provisions of
this Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act shall supersede any and all
laws of the States and of political subdivisions thereof insofar as they may now or here-
after relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act, or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act ....
120 CONG. REC. 5002 (1974).
31. ERISA §§ 2-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1975) repealed and replaces the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958). See R. BILDERSEE, PENSION
REGULATION MANUAL: ANALYSIS, FoRMs, AND PROCEDURES 1 (1975).
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"relationship to the plan" test.32
Although the conference committee report on section 514 merely
paraphrased the statute,33 several sponsors of ERISA, including Sena-
tors Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams and Representative John
Dent, indicated in their comments on the bill that the more sweeping
preemption provision was designed to cope with: (1) variations in state
regulation from state to state; (2) conflicts between federal and state
regulations; and (3) burdensome litigation over the precise scope of
ERISA's preemption concerning the issue of relationship of state law.34
It is likely that Congress believed that these problems, in the absence of
32. See H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974), reprinledin [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5162.
33. Id
34. Senator Javits commented:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption, but-with one major exception
appearing in the House bill-defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the
areas regulated by the bill. Such formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation
over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as
opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to
deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly
connected to the Federal regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regulation-at either the State or Federal level-
undoubtedly warrants further attention, on balance, the emergence of a comprehensive
and pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate
plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State action in the field
of private employee benefit programs.
120 CONG. REc. 29942 (1974).
Senator Williams stated:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substan-
tive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the
field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply
in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law.
120 CONG. REc. 29933 (1974).
Representative Dent noted:
Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning achievement of this
legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of
employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection
afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and
local regulation. ...
The conferees, with the narrow exceptions specifically enumerated, applied this princi-
ple in its broadest sense to foreclose any non-Federal Regulation or employee benefit
plans. Thus, the provisions of section 514 would reach any rule, regulation, practice or
decision of any State, subdivision thereof or any agency or instrumentality thereof-
including any professional society or association operating under color of law-which
would affect any employee benefit plan as described in section 4(a) and not exempt
under section 4(b).
120 CONG. REc. 29197 (1974).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/9
ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
a strong preemption provision, would discourage employers from
adopting or maintaining employee benefit plans."
II. FOUR THEORIES OF THE MEANING OF "RELATE TO"
The courts have endorsed four distinct theories of the phrase "relate
to" in defining the scope of preemption under section 514: (1) the plain
meaning theory; (2) the legislative purpose theory; (3) the proximity
theory; and (4) the specific conflict theory.36 The scope of preemption
associated with each theory varies considerably-from broadest under
the plain meaning theory to narrowest under the specific conflict the-
ory.
The plain meaning theory37 advances a literal and unqualified inter-
pretation of the phrase "relate to." This approach has considerable fa-
cial validity. Congress' specific exemption in section 514 of state
regulation of insurance, banking, and securities businesses and state
criminal laws3" suggests that it may have intended no more excep-
tions.39 In addition, this interpretation is consistent with the legislative
history of the preemption provision. In adopting the conference ver-
sion of section 514, Congress rejected the narrower language of the
House4 ° and Senate' versions, both of which expressed preemption in
terms of the state law's relationship to ERISA rather than to the benefit
plan.
At the other extreme, the specific conflict theory42 limits preemption
35. See note 6 supra.
36. Two of these theories, the plain meaning and legislative purpose theories, derive fiom
application of standard methods of statutory interpretation. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRE-
TATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 95, 109 (1975). The two other theories, the proximity and
specific conflict theories, are glosses on the phrase "relate to" and are specific to the context of
§ 514.
37. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978);
Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978); National Carriers' Conf.
Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
afl'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
38. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
39. The maxim is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 47 (1975).
40. See note 29 supra.
41. See note 30 supra.
42. See Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976); In re Mar-
riage of Pardee, 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976); In re M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403
N.Y.S.2d 411 (Fain. Ct. 1978); Gast v. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
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to state laws that either duplicate or conflict with specific provisions of
ERISA. Because ERISA generally provides protection to operating
employee benefit plans but does not require employers to provide spe-
cific benefits, 43 the Act, under this theory, would not preempt state laws
requiring such benefits.' The specific conflict theory, however, is at
odds with the plain meaning of the language of section 514, which su-
persedes any state law that relates to a benefit plan, not to a specific
ERISA provision.45 In fact, the theory is consistent with the narrower
House version that the congressional conferees rejected.46
The legislative purpose and proximity theories fall between these two
extremes. The legislative purpose theory47 goes beyond a literal inter-
pretation of section 514 by limiting the phrase "relate to" to relation-
ships that Congress would likely find consistent with the policy of
ERISA or even other federal legislation.48 Several versions of the legis-
lative purpose theory are evident in these decisions, each corresponding
to a different legislative policy.
Like the specific conflict theory, the legislative purpose theory fo-
cuses on the relationship between the state law and ERISA rather than
on the relationship between the state law and the benefit plan. Because
the legislative purpose theory considers broader policy concerns and
not only specific ERISA provisions, however, it allows a somewhat
broader scope of preemption than the specific conflict theory.
43. See note 6 supra.
44. California, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Minnesota have passed health insurance laws
that required such benefits. See notes 58, 66, 71, 77 infra.
45. See note 23 supra.
46. See note 29 supra. The passage in the Senate version-"subject matters regulated by this
Act or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act," 120 CoNG. REc. 5002 (1974)-is ambigu-
ous. If it refers to specific provisions of those statutes rather than to their general policy, then the
Senate version also would be consistent with the specific conflict theory.
47. Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dep't of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979),pelitionfor cer.filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Aug. 16, 1979) (No. 79-258); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State
Div. of Human Rights, 61 A.D.2d 822, 402 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1978); National Bank of N. Am. v.
Local 3, IBEW, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
48. Legislative purpose differs from legislative intent. Any attempt to interpret a statute in-
volves an inference of intent. Congress could have intended the literal meaning of § 514 or a
meaning consistent with one of the other theories. Legislative purpose, as used here, refers to the
general policy concerns of Congress against which specific passages are interpreted to avoid a
literal reading. Thus, an alleged legislative policy behind the plain meaning theory of encourag-
ing employers to adopt and maintain benefit plans, see note 6 supra, is not an example of a
"legislative purpose" under the legislative purpose theory as defined.
[Vol. 58:143
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The proximity theory' 9 interprets the phrase "relate to" to implicitly
exclude tenuous, indirect relationships. This approach, in effect, quali-
fies the phrase with the adverb "directly." The language of section 514
does not support this qualification. In fact, the definition of "State" in
section 514(c) includes "a State, any political subdivision thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, di-
rectly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans
covered by this sub-chapter."50
Some courts have adopted, in addition to the above theories, a rule
of statutory interpretation that creates a presumption that Congress
does not intend to preempt state law in areas of important and tradi-
tional state interest without specifically stating or otherwise clearly in-
dicating the law to be preempted.5' One problem with this
presumption is that, except for an occasional provision like section 206,
Congress did not specify in ERISA any state law for preemption. 2 In
section 514 Congress merely stated that ERISA supersedes "any and all
State laws"5 3 that relate to a benefit plan.
Although each theory has found some support in the preemption
cases, adoption of different theories does not necessarily yield different
decisions on preemption in any given case. Decisions to preempt state
law under either the legislative purpose or the proximity theory would
be the same as those under the broader plain meaning theory; similarly,
decisions to preempt under the narrow specific conflict theory would be
identical to those under any of the other theories.
49. A.T. & T. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456
F. Supp. 867, arffd on rehearing, 464 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1978); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85
Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1978).
50. ERISA § 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2) (1975) (emphasis added).
51. Cartledg'e v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Buczynski v. General Motors
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, aft'don rehearing, 464 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1978); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v.
Dep't of Indus., 453 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aft'd, 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979); Stone v.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), aj'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978); In re Marriage of
Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978), petiiionfor cert fled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3086
(U.S. Mar. 19, 1979) (No. 79-1445). This rule recognizes the constitutional implications of federal
preemption of state sovereignty. See note 14 supra. Perhaps it is reasonable to treat this rule as a
variant of the legislative purpose theory, i e., the congressional policy is protection of state sover-
eignty. See note 48 supra. Because this treatment of the rule would be applicable to any preemp-
tion of state law by federal law, it is preferable to consider it to be a rule of statutory
interpretation.
52. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
53. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1975).
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III. INSURANCE REGULATION CASES
The first step in analyzing the insurance law cases is to identify the
point at which a state law comes into contact with the plan. 4 Some
bona fide employee benefit plans self-insure, but many plans purchase
insurance to provide the agreed-upon benefits. Thus, any state law that
regulates the insurance business regulates, at least indirectly, a plan
that purchases insurance,"5 and any law that regulates a self-insured
plan regulates that plan directly. Furthermore, a self-insured plan is
not the same as an insurance business; thus, it may not qualify for an
insurance exemption.5 6
The two insurance regulation decisions holding that ERISA pre-
empted a state law concerned direct regulation of benefit plans. Both
cases adopted a plain meaning theory of the phrase "relate to." In
Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud 7 the court invalidated the 1974 Hawaii
Prepaid Health Care Act,58 which differed from ERISA in certain ad-
ministrative details such as reporting59 and in its mandate that all
workers be covered by a prepaid health care plan.60 Standard Oil's
self-insured health care plan for its employees met ERISA standards,
but did not satisfy the Hawaii reporting requirements or cover alcohol
and drug abuse as the Hawaii law demanded.
The court rejected a specific conflict theory of section 51461 in favor
of a plain meaning theory, finding support for that choice in Congress'
rejection of the two narrower versions of section 514.62 Additionally,
54. See note 26 supra.
55. See Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
56. See note 26 supra.
57. 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
58. HAwAII REv. STAT. §§ 393-1 to 396-15 (1976).
59. 442 F. Supp. at 696.
60. _d
61. Insofar as the Hawaii Act does not regulate matters covered by ERISA (basically
reporting, disclosure, funding, vesting, and fiduciary duties), it would not, under this
interpretation, be superseded because it does not relate to employee benefit plans in any
of the ways that ERISA relates to employee benefit plans. ERISA and the Hawaii Act
would be complementary, each occupying part of a field not occupied by the other.
Under this interpretation, Hawaiian workers would obtain the protection of both the
Hawaii Act, which regulates benefits but not administration, and ERISA, which regu-
lates administration but not benefits.
Id at 706-07 (footnote omitted).
62. At one point the court said, "In any normal meaning, the Hawaii Act relates to employee
benefit plans .... When Congress says 'any and all State laws,' courts cannot conclude that Con-
gress really meant to say 'some but not all State laws.'" 442 F. Supp. at 707. The court also
concluded that the legislative history indicates § 514 "meanfs] what it says" and "forecloses any
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the court concluded that Congress might have had good reason to
avoid imposing on employers substantive benefits beyond the adminis-
trative safeguards included in ERISA.63 Under ERISA the provision
of substantive benefits is to remain voluntary-a matter between em-
ployers and employees; thus, Congress might wish to preempt any state
additions to the federal requirements that would discourage the adop-
tion of benefit plans.'s
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes65 the court held that ERISA pre-
empted California's Knox-Keene Act,66 a statute regulating the deliv-
ery of health care services to state residents who participate in health
care service plans. The Knox-Keene Act governed entities that directly
deliver health care services or furnish insurance-type protection, in-
cluding the self-funded ERISA plans offered by plaintiffs. The Califor-
nia Act regulated such areas as funding, disclosure, sales practice, and
quality of service, and required that any plan be licensed by the State
Commissioner of Corporations. Thus, the Act directly affected benefit
plans.
In deciding the preemption issue, the court favored the plain mean-
ing theory, arguing that the language of section 51467 and its legislative
history (rejection of the earlier House and Senate versions)68 indicated
an intention to broadly preempt state laws such as Knox-Keene. The
decision did not explicitly reject the three other theories, but the court
by implication rejected the specific conflict theory by noting the confer-
ence committee's rejection of the House version of section 514, which
corresponded to that theory.6 9
Two insurance regulation decisions have held against preemption
and in favor of the validity of state law. One of these cases, Wadsworth
interpretation which would narrow its scope beyond its plain language." Id at 707. For the
legislative history of § 514, see notes 29-30 supra.
63. The process of using policy argument to justify a plain meaning theory is different from
the adoption of a legislative purpose theory. The legislative purpose theory, as defined, involves
use of a policy that is capable ofjustifying departures from a literal interpretation where appropri-
ate. See note 48 supra.
64. See note 6 supra. Thus, § 514 prevents states from requiring more "liberal" protection
for plan beneficiaries than that required by Congress.
65. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
66. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399.64 (Deering Supp. 1979).
67. 425 F. Supp. at 1297.
68. "The Conference Committee Report indicates that the committee intended preemption
just as broad as the statutory language suggests . Id at 1298. See also id at 1299-1300.
69. Id at 1300.
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v. Nhaland,70 also adopted the plain meaning theory, despite the dif-
ference in outcomes. The Wadsworth case, however, is distinguishable
from the previous cases. The pertinent New Hampshire statute71 regu-
lated group accident and health insurance plans available for purchase
by those employee benefit plans which are not self-insuring. Thus the
state law in this case, unlike the Hawaii and California laws, regulated
employee benefit plans only indirectly. An argument against preemp-
tion under a proximity theory would have been appropriate, but the
decision adopted the plain meaning theory72 and held that the New
Hampshire Act related to benefit plans within the meaning of section
514 .7 The court explicitly rejected the specific conflict theory74 and
implicitly ruled out the proximity theory by concluding that the indi-
rectness of the relationship does not by itself preclude preemption. The
New Hampshire statute escaped preemption because of the insurance
business exception; although the statute related to benefit plans, it con-
stituted a permissible regulation of the insurance industry.75
In Insurers'Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton76 the court considered pre-
emption of the Minnesota Comprehensive Insurance Act of 1976.
77
That Act required employers who offered health-care plans to make
available to employees a certain type of qualified policy that provided
specific benefits or their actuarial equivalent. The Act thus impinged
directly on welfare benefit plans and imposed substantive benefit re-
quirements on employers.
In rejecting the preemption argument, the court endorsed the specific
conflict theory of preemption rejected in the three other insurance regu-
lation cases.78 The court also reasoned that section 514(d)79 provides
that ERISA shall not be construed to supersede any law of the United
70. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
71. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 415: 18-a(1), 419: 5-a, 420: 5-a (Supp. 1977).
72. "The argument that the plans would be detrimentally affected and might face bankruptcy
or extinction cannot change the plain meaning of ERISA." 562 F.2d at 78.
73. Id at 77.
74. "Congress, therefore, clearly rejected a concept of preemption limited to conflicting or
duplicate state law, in favor of applying the principle in its 'broadest sense.'" Id
75. Id at 77-78.
76. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
77. 1976 Minn. Laws, ch. 296.
78. In the first place, [§ 514] provides that with a very narrow exception, ERISA should
not be construed to relieve any person froni any state law regulating insurance, banking,
or securities. Thus, the conflict between the challenged state insurance law and ERISA
has to be very clear in order to trigger the preemption provision. The only substantive
parts of ERISA which relate to health and accident insurance are the reporting and
[Vol. 58:143
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States and that preemption of the Minnesota Act would violate the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act principle of state primacy in regulation of the
insurance business.80 This approach, however, ignores the conference
committee's abandonment of the House version of preemption, which
was consistent with the specific conflict theory.8 More importantly, the
reasoning based on McCarran-Ferguson also blurs the distinction be-
tween the insurance business and employee benefit plans.8 2 If state reg-
ulation that impinges directly on these nonprofit plans is considered
regulation of the insurance business merely because the plans purchase
insurance or self-insure, then the deemer clause of section 5143 is func-
tionless and the preemption provision becomes powerless to preempt
any state regulation of benefit plans.
Thus, with the exception of Insurers'Action Council, 4 the insurance
decisions favor preemption when the state law directly affects benefit
plans and explicitly endorse the plain meaning theory of the meaning
of "relate to."
IV. DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES
A. General Pattern
In the domestic relations cases, most of which came after the insur-
ance decisions, the courts generally have found that ERISA does not
preempt state property law. 5 Some of these decisions examined the
meaning of "relate to" in both the general terms of section 514 and the
more specific language of section 206;86 others relied on an interpreta-
tion of section 206 without discussing section 514.87 All the cases dis-
cussing section 514, however, have retreated from the plain meaning
disclosure provisions. These requirements have nothing to do with the substance of the
insurance plans which employers must offer their employees.
423 F. Supp. at 926.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1975).
80. 423 F. Supp. at 926. See also note 26 supra.
81. See note 29 supra.
82. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
83. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1975). See note 24 supra.
84. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
85. See note 16 supra.
86. See note 16 supra.
87. See Operating Eng'rs Local 428 v. Zamborsky, 470 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Ariz. 1979); Cody
v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), ai'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Cogollos v. Cogol-
los, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d
784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fain. Ct. 1978). See generally Comment, supra note 14.
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theory that justified the Standard Oil and Hewlett-Packard decisions
and have endorsed one of the three other theories.
B. Community Property Jurisdictions
In community property jurisdictions, the general issue is whether
ERISA preempts community property division of pension rights either
because of the general preemption provision of section 514 or because
of the more specific limitation on alienation and assignment in section
206. Most of the community property cases have arisen in California. 8
In re Marriage of Pardee,89 an early case, suggested in dicta that
Congress intended section 514 to preempt state law only in "matters
involving the safeguards necessary to secure equitable administra-
tion."90 Through this language, the court seemingly embraced the spe-
cific conflict theory.
The leading case holding against preemption in the community
property area is Stone v. Stone,9 in which a federal district court92
adopted a form of the legislative purpose theory9 3 and concluded that
state community property law does not relate to benefit plans within
the meaning of section 514.11 The court advanced four policy argu-
ments to support its interpretation. First, state regulation of domestic
relations is a better-established tradition than state regulation of benefit
plans; therefore, Congress presumably did not intend to impinge so
88. California property law treats pension rights, whether vested or not, as a property interest
subject to division as community property on dissolution of the marriage to the extent that such
rights derive from employment during coverture. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544
P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). Brown overruled thirty-five years of California law. Prior
cases had held that nonvested pension rights were mere expectancies. See general, Reppy, supra
note 22.
89. 408 F. Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
90. Id at 669 n.4.
91. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
92. Judge Renfrew, who also wrote the Hewlett-Packard and Standard 0/1 decisions, aban-
doned the plain meaning theory of these earlier cases.
93. The decision also suggested the proximity theory by asserting that Congress did not mean
to preempt a body of state law with only "the most tangential relation to ERISA." 450 F. Supp. at
932.
94. Id at 933. Stone also examined the possibility of specific preemption of community
property law by § 206 and concluded that "alienation" and "assignment" do not refer to the divi-
sion of community property under state law. Id at 926. Judge Renfrew found these terms and
the legislative history ambiguous. 1d at 925. He based his decision that § 206 does not apply to
community property law primarily on a presumed congressional desire that ERISA protect the
dependents of employees. Id at 931.
[Vol. 58:143
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heavily on traditional state sovereignty by preempting community
property law.95 Second, in the event of preemption, nonemployee
spouses would have no alternative to state law as a means of acquiring
their share of the benefits.96 Third, preemption of community property
law is inconsistent with the congressional goal of insuring benefits for
the dependents of employees as well as for the employees themselves.97
Last, dependent spouses, unlike business creditors, cannot protect their
interest by limiting the amount they will invest in the relationship. 98
Francis v. United Technologies Corp.99 disregarded Stone v. Stone,
95. The Court cannot find in § 514(a) the clear evidence of congressional intent to pre-
empt state community property laws insofar as they relate to benefit plans that is neces-
sary for a finding of preemption of state domestic relations laws. . . .Regulation of
benefit plans is an exercise of the police powers of states, but state regulation of benefit
plans is not nearly as well established as state regulation of community property. To
preclude state regulation of this latter area would involve a much more radical distur-
bance of "the federal-state balance" . . . than preclusion of state regulation of benefit
plans. Accordingly, the presumption against preemption in the area of community prop-
erty is correspondingly stronger.
Id at 932 (citation omitted). See also note 51 supra and accompanying text.
96. A second basis for distinguishing Standard Oil involves the effect of preemption on
individuals whom the state seeks to protect. Preemption of the Hawaii health insurance
law does not prevent Hawaiian workers from bargaining for the benefits which the state
statute sought to guarantee. Although part of the reason for the statute may have been to
ensure that workers with little bargaining power would obtain those benefits, the in-
tended beneficiaries of the statute were not rendered incapable of achieving the protec-
tion. The intended beneficiaries of the California community property laws would be
placed at a significantly greater disadvantage by preemption. Preemption would deprive
nonemployee spouses of the share in marital assets which they indirectly helped to ac-
quire, and it would leave them without effective remedies against their husbands ....
450 F. Supp. at 932-33.
97. Congress was concerned not only about the workers themselves whose employment
entitles them to benefits. Congress was also concerned about the families of those work-
ers who depend to the same degree on the actual availability of those benefits. It would
be ironic indeed if a provision designed in part to ensure that an employee spouse would
be able to meet his obligations to family after retirement were interpreted to permit him
to evade them with impunity after divorce.
Id at 926.
98. A second reason to conclude that ERISA treats community property interests differ-
ently from other claims against benefits is that the nonemployee spouse cannot minimize
her losses if her husband fails to honor his obligations to her. The insulation by ERISA
of a substantial community asset from her community property claims if the marriage
ends in divorce should not lead the nonemployee spouse to anticipate (and perhaps pre-
cipitate) that event by limiting her contributions to the marital partnership ...
This unavoidable vulnerability of nonemployee spouses contrasts with the position of
business creditors. Depriving business creditors of recourse against this kind of asset is
fair, because they have "only themselves to blame for extending credit to a person whose
interest under the [benefit plan] had been put beyond their reach" without first ascertain-
ing the extent and character of the debtor's resources.
Id at 926-27.
99. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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which had been decided in the same district, and apparently adopted
the plain meaning theory of relatedness."° A California Court of Ap-
peals, in In re Marriage of Johnston,' on the other hand, selected
Stone's approach over Francis' on the basis of the proximity theory.10 2
C. Common-Law Jurisdictions
In a common-law property state, the preemption issue is whether a
court can invoke state law to garnish a pension payment as a means of
compelling court-ordered support of spouse or children. The courts in
all cases but one' 03 have answered the question affirmatively, despite
the possibility of preemption under sections 514 and 206.
In the leading case of,. T& T v. Merry,14 the Second Circuit relied
on the proximity theory in rejecting a literal interpretation of "relate
to" and allowing garnishment of the pension of a husband delinquent
in his support payments. 0 The court concluded that a literal construc-
tion of section 514 "would necessarily lead to the unreasonable conclu-
sion that Congress intended to preempt even those state laws that only
in the most remote and peripheral manner touch upon pension
plans." 106
100. "This language was intended to effect the broadest possible preemption of state law. The
inclusion of all state laws which 'relate to' any ERISA plan was an attempt to make this preemp-
tion cover laws which were not specifically directed at this subject area, but which still affected it."
Id at 86.
101. 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978).
102. The argument is that California community property law, unlike the Knox-Keene Act,
does not affect the administration or regulation of ERISA plans, but only the "distribution of the
pension benefits after a right thereto has been established under federal law." Id at 910, 149 Cal,
Rptr. at 804.
103. General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
104. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979). Aecord Senco, Inc. v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
105. The court also suggested that garnishment is not a voluntary transfer and therefore is not
covered by § 206. 592 F.2d at 121 n.8.
106. Id at 121. A number of other cases did not discuss § 514, but relied entirely on an
interpretation of§ 206. These cases overwhelmingly support the pattern of holdings that ERISA
does not preempt state law of garnishment and attachment in the domestic relations area, when
the courts apply these procedures to ERISA benefit plans. The cases are not particularly helpful,
however, in interpreting the meaning of "relate to" in § 514.
In Cody v. Riecker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), af'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), a
federal district court characterized the garnishment as an assignment, but assumed that Congress
did not intend in ERISA to interfere with the enforceability of New York state domestic relations
law. In Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fai. Ct. 1978), a New
York family court concluded that treatment of a spouse as a creditor barred from a state remedy
by § 206 would be inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA to protect the rights of dependents and
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In Cartledge v. Aillerl°7a federal district court held that courts
should not preempt statutes enacted under the state's police powers un-
less preemption was clearly the intent of Congress.108 Treating section
206 as a specific instance of preemption, the court embraced the legisla-
tive purpose theory by concluding that the purpose of ERISA includes
protection of the rights of spouses and children to employee benefits. 109
The court noted as evidence of that purpose provisions of ERISA that
mention employee dependents" 0 or employee beneficiaries."'
In In re J.- v. M.fH 112 a New York family court used a variant of
the specific conflict theory. The court treated section 206 as a specific
example of section 514 preemption and interpreted section 206 as refer-
ring to voluntary transfers, not involuntary seizures under domestic re-
lations law. Because garnishment of a pension fund did not violate
section 206, the court found that ERISA did not preempt the garnish-
ment." 13
V. CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
The specific issue in these cases has been the preemption of state laws
prohibiting, as sex discrimination, the lack of disability coverage for
pregnancy. Most cases have held against preemption,1 4 but the courts
have not provided an unambiguous interpretation of the meaning of
the phrase "relate to."
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor, & Human Rela-
tions" 15 illustrates the confusion. The Seventh Circuit held that section
514(d), which provides that ERISA shall not "be construed to alter,
would not be in the public interest. 93 Misc. 2d at 787-88, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 704-05. Operating
Eng'rs Local 428 v. Zamborsky, 470 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Ariz. 1979) adopted the same arguments.
Similarly, in Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406,402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978), a New York
supreme court held against preemption in this situation as "fully consistent with logic, fair play,
common sense, and manifest intent in terms of the overall federal objective." Id. at 408, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 930. In contrast, a federal district court in Michigan simply held, on the basis of the
supremacy clause, that § 206 precludes garnishment. General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F.
Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
107. 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
108. Id at 1154.
109. Id at 1156.
110. Id; ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1975).
111. ERISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1975).
112. 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
113. Id at 1022, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
114. See note 17 supra.
115. 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979).
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amend, modify, invalidate, impair or supersede any law of the United
States,""' 6 precludes preemption of the Wisconsin disability statute.
The court interpreted section 514(d) to exempt a state law if its preemp-
tion would affect federal law, and concluded that preemption of the
Wisconsin statute would alter and probably impair congressional in-
corporation of state fair employment law into federal civil rights law.'1 7
Before deciding that section 514(d) explicitly exempted state civil
rights laws, the court concluded that these laws relate to plans within
the intended meaning of section 514.118 The court did not endorse a
theory of the meaning of the phrase "relate to," but rejected the specific
conflict theory 1 9 and the proximity theory 20 and suggested that the
legislative purpose theory applied in the domestic relations cases' 2' was
appropriate to the circumstances of those cases.'
22
In contrast, the district court in Perval Industries, Inc. v. Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities23 held that ERISA
preempts state civil rights law. The court rejected the argument for an
exemption, based on 514(d),' 24 that the Bucyrus-Erie court adopted. In
116. ERISA § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1975).
117. 599 F.2d at 210-11.
118. Id at 209-10.
119. "Therefore we do not think the section can properly be limited to preempt only those
state laws which are specifically related to employee benefit plans or which only relate to these
plans by imposing requirements inconsistent with ERISA." Id at 209.
120. id at 209-10.
121. The court focused on A.T. & T. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979), and Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
122. 599 F.2d at 209-10 & n.8.
123. 468 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), a'd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979). 4ccord, Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] PeNS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 22,622 (D. Mont. Aug. 14, 1978).
124. Defendants also contend that § 514 does not accomplish preemption of Connecti-
cut's anti-discrimination law because of the interaction of § 514(d) and provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e et seq. Section 514(d), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(d), provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States ....
Section 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall
be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punish-
ment provided by any present or future law of any State. . . ." The argument is that
ERISA does not supersede any federal law, Title VII preserves state anti-discrimination
laws from preemption by Title VII, and "therefore" ERISA does not preempt state anti-
discrimination laws ...
This Court does not accept the reasoning of this double savings clause contention.
Section 514(d) of ERISA preserves federal law. Connecticut's anti-discrimination law
does not become a federal law simply because Title VII preserves its validity as against a
claim of preemption by Title VII. Nor is the textual argument significantly enhanced by
focusing on § 514(b)'s requirement that ERISA should not be construed to "impair" any
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deciding that the state antidiscrimination law related to ERISA plans,
the court clearly rejected the specific conflict theory 25 and appeared to
endorse the plain meaning theory. 12 6
Passage of a federal requirement of pregnancy coverage in disability
payments 27 probably has mooted this specific issue for cases arising
after the requirement takes effect.' 28 Section 514 clearly does not pre-
empt a federal sex discrimination statute. The issue will persist, how-
ever, in cases involving other forms of sex discrimination when a state's
law of the United States. Preemption of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-126(g) by ERISA does
not impair any federal law. Title VII did not create new authority for state anti-discrimi-
nation laws; it simply left them where they were before the enactment of Title VII.
Whatever is prohibited by Title VII remains prohibited under ERISA, but exclusion of
disability benefits for pregnancy does not violate Title VII, Gilbert v. General Electric
Corp., 429 U.S. 125, 97 S. Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976).
468 F. Supp. at 492-93.
125. Nor is there merit in defendants' contention that ERISA preempts only those state
laws that deal with the specific subjects covered by subchapter I of ERISA. This claim is
refuted by the provisions of § 514(b)(4), explicitly excepting from preemption "any gen-
erally applicable criminal law of a State." If Congress had thought that only state laws
specifically dealing with the subjects covered by subchapter I of ERISA were to be pre-
empted by § 514(a), it would not have had to preserve generally applicable criminal
laws, since they would not have been preempted in the first place. The exception to
preemption for generally applicable criminal laws becomes necessary only when it is
understood that, without such an exception, § 514(a) preempts all state laws that relate to
covered plans, whether the relation arises because a state law is specifically designed to
affect such plans or because, as in this case, a state law of general application includes
covered plans within its sweep.
Id at 492.
126. Plainly Connecticut's anti-discrimination law, legislating specifically on the subject
of disability benefits, is a law that relates to an employee benefit plan. This Court there-
fore disagrees with the conclusion reached in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department ofIndustry,
Labor and Human Relations, 453 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Wis. 1978), that preemption of state
anti-discrimination laws has not occurred because ERISA did not expressly provide that
state fair employment laws are superseded. While preemption by implication is not fa-
vored, see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 10
L. Ed.2d 248 (1963), there is no requirement that Congress identify the several categories
of state laws it wishes to preempt. Having elected to preempt all laws relating to covered
plans, and to specify the categories of state laws that are not preempted, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A), (b)(4), Congress is entitled to have its clearly expressed intentions car-
ried out.
Id at 492.
127. 1978 Amendment to The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
128. Our bill does not address State sex discrimination laws and such cases as Goodyear
Tre A Rubber Co. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 16 EPD 8163 (Wisc. Cir.
Ct. 1978) and Montana State Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Comm'n ofLabor and Ind,
No. 41908 (1st Jud. Dist. of Mont., Aug. 14, 1978) because passage of the pregnancy sex
discrimination amendments, Public Law 95-955, appears to have mooted the issue of
preemption of State laws requiring disability plans to cover pregnancy-related leave.
125 CONG. REc. S575 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Jacob Javits concerning proposed
amendments to § 514).
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statutory proscription or remedy differs from the federal protection.
The issue will persist, as well, in other areas of state civil rights law,
such as age discrimination, 129 when state and federal law diverge.
VI. A GUIDELINE FOR DECIDING THE "RELATE To" QUESTION
In the insurance, domestic relations, and civil rights areas, a fairly
clear majority of cases has held that section 514 preempts the insurance
laws, but does not preempt the domestic relations or civil rights laws.
The meaning of the phrase "relate to," however, and the consequent
application of section 514 in other areas of state law remain unclear
after these cases. At least one case has endorsed each of the four theo-
ries of the meaning of the phrase.130 Except for the two theories of
intermediate scope, the legislative purpose and proximity theories,
these interpretations are incompatible. The phrase cannot have the ex-
pansive meaning of the plain meaning theory in one context, such as
insurance regulation, but a more restrictive meaning of one of the three
other theories in another context, such as domestic relations or civil
rights law. It is possible, however, to derive from these cases an inter-
pretation of the phrase that reconciles the seemingly inconsistent deci-
sions in the three areas. Either intermediate theory accounts for the
general pattern in the insurance and domestic relations cases.' 3' Under
the proximity theory, an insurance law requirement of specific health
benefits would result in preemption as a direct regulation of ERISA
plans, but a domestic relations law requiring distribution of plan assets
within the employee's family would not.'32 Similarly, under the legis-
lative purpose theory, limitation of plan requirements to those men-
tioned in ERISA as an incentive to employers to provide benefit plans
is a congressional policy that would support a decision to preempt a
more restrictive state insurance law, 133 but protection of employee de-
pendents is a congressional policy that would support a decision to
avoid preemption of a state domestic relations law. 34
129. See note 163 infra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 37, 42, 47, 49 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra. The plain meaning theory cannot explain the
general decision not to preempt in the domestic relations and civil rights cases. At the other
extreme the specific conflict theory would not yield the majority result in the insurance cases and it
is flatly inconsistent with the legislative history of § 514. See notes 29, 61, 62 supra.
132. In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 909-10, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798, 804 (1978).
133. See note 6 supra.
134. See notes 97, 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
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The legislative purpose and proximity theories suggest conflicting re-
suits for civil rights law. Section 514(d) can be read to indicate a con-
gressional purpose to avoid preemption of state law complementing
federal civil rights policy, 135 but a state law requirement that benefit
plans cover pregnancy expenses is in direct proximity to ERISA plans
in a way comparable to California and Hawaii health insurance re-
quirements preempted in Standard Oil and Hewlett-Packard.136 Thus,
the legislative purpose theory is consistent with the majority outcome
for all three areas, the proximity theory fails to predict the majority
outcome only in the civil rights area.
When combined with the statutory interpretation rule 37 followed in
a number of cases-that Congress will not be presumed to have in-
tended to preempt areas of important and traditional state interest such
as domestic relations and related property law' 3 6 -the courts' analyses
distill into a three-part guideline. A state law "relates to" a benefit plan
under section 514 if (1) it affects the plan directly; (2) it is inconsistent
with some national policy embodied in ERISA or other federal legisla-
tion; and (3) it does not represent an important and traditional state
interest.
This guideline is also useful for approaching new areas of section 514
litigation. Cases in other areas are too few yet to establish recognizable
patterns, but it is possible to apply the guideline to those issues which
have arisen. The guideline clearly calls for preemption of state law in
two substantive areas--state taxation of employee benefit plans' 39 and
state laws on restitution. 40
Taxation of a benefit plan affects the plan directly by reducing its
capacity to provide benefits. Thus, taxation also conflicts with the ER-
ISA policy of protecting the financial condition of benefit plans' 4' by
135. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 57, 65 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
138. Gast v. Stevenson, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978), included sex discrimination as
one of the "areas that traditionally have been matters of vital state concern." Id at 458, 585 P.2d
at 23. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, (N.D. Cal. 1978), however, recognized that state regula-
tion of employee health insurance, as an exercise of the state's police power, is "not nearly as well
established as state regulation of community property." Id at 932.
139. National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
140. Martin v. Hamill, No. 78-C-2643, slip. op. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1979); Bacon v. Wang, 445
F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
141. See text accompanying notes 1-2 rupra.
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granting federal tax exemptions for qualified plans.'42 In addition, tax-
ation of nonprofit organizations is hardly a traditional state interest.
The restitution problem arises because section 403(c) of ERISA pro-
hibits refunds of trust funds to employers, except under specified cir-
cumstances.' 43  One of these circumstances is mistake of fact.144
Section 403(c) thus implicitly preempts any state law that provides res-
titution for mistake of law. On the combined authority of this section
and section 514, courts, in fact, have found preemption. 45 Even with-
out section 403(c), the three-part guideline suggests arguments for pre-
emption. First, a court order to refund contributions affects the plan
just as directly as removal of funds by taxation. Second, restitutionary
depletion of funds, like taxation, conflicts with ERISA's policy of pro-
tecting the financial condition of plans; judicial depletion by restitution,
in fact, may be more threatening than taxation to a plan's financial
stability because it is less predictable. Third, restitution is not as obvi-
ously a traditional state interest as is domestic relations or property
law. In any event section 403 rebuts the presumption against preemp-
tion in areas of traditional state concern by prohibiting refunds.
In contrast, it would be inappropriate under the proposed guideline
to preempt state laws that license and regulate lawyers working for pre-
paid legal service plans.'4 6 Professional licensing and regulation prin-
cipally affects only professionals and thus only indirectly affects the
plans for which professionals work. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a
court would find that provision of ERISA plan services to incompetent
or unscrupulous professionals comports with any ERISA or other fed-
eral policy. Finally, licensing and regulation of professions is a long-
standing state activity.
Similar arguments apply to state laws that prohibit deductions from
pension payments to offset workers' compensation benefits.' 47 One
court has reasoned that this sort of law does not affect the plan qua
plan, because the law is concerned with preserving ERISA plan bene-
142. I.R.C. §§ 401-415, 501.
143. ERISA § 403(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1975).
144. Id at § 403(c)(2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A).
145. See note 140 supra.
146. Suffolk County Bar Ass'n v. Law Research Serv., Inc., [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] P-Ns.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1978).
147. Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867, aj'd on rehearing, 464 F. Supp.
133 (D.N.J. 1978).
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fits. '4 In addition, the ERISA policy of conserving workers' benefit
plan rights'4 9 is consistent with the goal of these workers' compensation
laws. Finally, workers compensation programs are a traditional state
function.
The guideline does not provide as clear an answer for laws providing
for garnishment of pension payments by an unrelated judgment credi-
tor.150 The impact of garnishment on a benefit plan is indirect in the
sense that garnishment proceedings affect only distribution of plan ben-
efits the worker has earned. Garnishment, furthermore, is a traditional
state function.' 5' On the other hand, ERISA policy considerations
favor preemption.' 52 In the case of alimony, child support, or commu-
nity property decrees, state law furthers the ERISA policy of protecting
dependents of plan participants by depriving the participants of pen-
sion proceeds and transfering them to their estranged families. 15 3
When the proceeds go to an unrelated creditor, however, the state law
is likely to deprive the participant's family of the security that ERISA
was designed to provide.' 54
VII. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 514
Senators Javits and Williams have responded to litigation over the
scope of preemption under section 514 by introducing amendments to
that section as part of the ERISA Improvements Act of 1979."' The
148. 456 F. Supp. at 873-74.
149. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
150. In re Parker, 473 F. Supp. 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Electrical Workers Local 1 v. IBEW-
NECA Holiday Trust, 583 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. 1979); National Bank of N. Am. v. Local 3, IBEW, 93
Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
151. Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Electrical Workers Local 1
v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust, 583 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Mo. 1979).
152. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
153. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
154. In re Parker, 473 F. Supp. 746, 748 n.l (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
155. S.209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CONG. REc. S560 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). Section 155
of that bill reads:
Section 514 of such Act is amended by-(l) adding at the end of subsection (b)(2)(B)
the following:
"A State insurance law which provides that a specific benefit or benefits must be pro-
vided or made available by a contract or policy of insurance issued to an employee
benefit plan is a law which relates to an employee benefit plan within the meaning of
subsection (a) and is not a law which regulates insurance within the meaning of subpara-
graph (A). A provision of State law which requires that a contract or policy of insurance
issued to an employee benefit plan must permit a participant to convert or continue
protection after it ceases to be provided under the employee benefit plan is a provision of
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Act adds an exception to section 514 for the Hawaii statute preempted
in Standard 01156 and "substantially identical"'' 57 state requirements.
a law described in a subparagraph (A) and not a provision of law described in subsection
(a).";
"(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) shall not apply to the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Law, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-I through 51, as in effect on
January 1, 1979, and to any other State law which is determined by the Secretary to-
"(i) be substantially identical to such Hawaii law on such date, and
"(ii) require benefits which are substantially identical in type and amount to those
required or permitted under such Hawaii law on such date.
"(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any provision of a State law which the Secre-
tary determines to be similar to any provision of parts 1, 4 and 5 of this subtitle.";
(2) adding a new subsection (b)(6) to read as follows:
"(6) Subsection (a) shall not apply respecting any judgment, decree, or order pursuant
to a State domestic relations law (whether of the common law or community property
type), if such judgment, decree or order is described in section 206(d)(3)"; and
(3) adding a new subsection (e) to read as follows:
"(e) For purposes of subsections (d)(2) and (3) and sections 515, 516, and 517, the term
'employee benefit plan' shall include any employee benefit plan-
"(1) defined in section 3 (3), irrespective of whether the only participants in the plan
are owner-employees as defined in section 401(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, and
"(2) which is described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section 4(b)."
Id at S564-65.
156. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
157. ERISA Improvements Act of 1979, S.209, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S575
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). Senator Javits explained:
Our bill proposes two new exceptions from Federal preemption. The first deals with
State health care-related statutes and is intended to address issues raised in such cases as
Standard Oil Co. of California v. .4gsa/ud, 442 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), Hellt-
Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aj7'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.
1978), Wadsworth v. Nhaland, No. 76-266 (D. N.H. 1977), a'd, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir.
1977), and Insurers' Actian Council Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn.
1976) ....
The proposed prepaid health care exception would save from ERISA preemption Ha-
waii's prepaid health care law and the health benefits required under it as in effect on
January 1, 1979. The bill would also save any other State law which is determined by
the Secretary of Labor to be substantially identical to such Hawaii law and to require
benefits which are substantially identical in type and amount to those required or per-
mitted by Hawaii on such a date. The bill would not save provisions of any such State
law which the Secretary determines to be similar to ERISA's reporting and disclosure,
fiduciary, and enforcement provisions. One purpose of this proposal is to save Hawaii's
program of mandatory employee health insurance which may be the most progressive
and enlightened State program of its kind in the Nation. As a supporter of a National
Health Insurance Plan, I like Hawaii's groundbreaking efforts and believe that a human-
itarian law like ERISA should not be the pretext for depriving citizens of that State the
benefits provided under its law. Another policy behind this provision is to balance the
desirability of such mandatory health insurance with the Federal interest in uniformity
of regulation of interstate employee benefit plans. Consequently, the bill saves only
those State statutes which are substantially identical to Hawaii's. Giving the Secretary
authority to determine which statutes are identical to Hawaii's will permit consistent
decisionmaking and avoid conflicting court decisions.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss1/9
Number 1] ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
The Act overrules Wadsworth' by declaring that a benefit require-
ment imposed on an insurance company is not a law that regulates the
insurance business, but instead "relates to" plans that purchase insur-
ance. 159 Although states may not impose benefits on plans by acting
upon insurers and pleading the insurance business exception, they may
impose some of the same benefits directly on the plans under the Stan-
dard Oil exception in the amendment. The Act also adds an exception
for state domestic relations law"s° and makes explicit the implicit ex-
158. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
159. S.209 § 155, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 125 CONG. REC. S564-65 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979).
Senator Javits explained:
The bill contains a second health-care related section which provides that a State in-
surance law which requires that a specific benefit be provided or made available by a
contract or policy of insurance issued to an employee benefit plan is preempted and is
not saved under the existing insurance exception-which is limited by the so-called
deemer clause. The proposal is intended to overrule the decision in Wadsworth against
W',aland in which the first circuit held that ERISA did not preempt a State insurance
statute requiring insurers to provide coverage in group health insurance policies for
treatment of mental illnesses and emotional disorders. Wadsworth permits indirect State
regulation of employee benefit plans and would encourage plans to avoid such regula-
tion through self-insurance. The bill, however, saves from preemption any provision of
State law which requires that a contract or policy of insurance issued to a plan must
permit a participant to convert or continue protection after it closes to be provided by the
plan.
Id at S.575.
160. Id This provision also modifies the anti-assignment and anti-alienation section of the
1974 Act. Senator Javits commented on this exception:
The second exception deals with State domestic relations statutes and is intended to ad-
dress questions raised in such cases as Stone v. Stone, No. C-77-1124-CBR (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 18, 1978), Francis . United Technologies, C.A. No. C 77-1504-CBP (N.D. Cal. Mar.
2, 1978), General Motors v. Townsend, Slip. op., No. 6-72159 (E.D. Mich. 1976), and
Cartledge v. Miller, 47 U.S. L.W. 2178 (Sept. 19, 1978).
The second exception to broad Federal preemption provided in our bill involves State
common law or community property domestic relations laws. The bill provides that
Federal preemption does not reach a judgment, decree or order, including an approval
of a property settlement, pursuant to a State common law or community property do-
mestic relations law which: First, affects the marital property rights of any person in any
benefit payable under a pension plan or the legal obligations of any person to provide
child support or make alimony payments, and second, does not require a pension plan to
alter the effective date, timing, form, duration or amount of any payments under the plan
or to honor any election provided under the plan which is made by a person other than a
participant or beneficiary.
The bill also provides that ERISA's anti-assignment and alienation of benefits rule
does not apply to such judgment, decree or order. The purpose of these provisions is to
reserve for the States their traditional control over marital and family matters, and to
assist plan administrators who are faced with the conflicting duties of obeying State court
decrees to pay benefits to plan participants' former spouses and also complying with the
Federal anti-alienation rule under penalty of plan disqualification.
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emption recognized in the majority of domestic relations cases.' 6'
The Act does not amend the "relate to" language of section 514;
therefore, the proper interpretation of that phrase as applied to areas of
state law not affected by these amendments still would be an open
question. The Act calls into question the continued validity of the
proximity theory by asserting that indirect regulation of plans through
regulation of their insurers "relates to" the plans within the sense of
section 514. Because the Act specifies one indirect relationship, how-
ever, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress may have intended to
exclude other indirect relationships from its definition of the phrase.
Further, it is not clear whether the Act indicates that domestic relations
law "relates to" benefit plans but is exempted, or whether the language
provides that this body of law does not "relate to" plans within the
meaning of section 514.
Senator Javits explained that the Act does not deal with the problem
of state sex discrimination laws requiring disability coverage for preg-
nancy because the sponsors believe the issue to be moot after the pas-
sage of comparable federal statutes.'62 Senator Javits also explained
that the Act does not address the problem of state age-discrimination
law or state regulation of professionals in prepaid legal service plans
"because these matters appear not to be ripe for legislation."' 16 3
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress' piecemeal approach to the problems of section 514 does
little to clarify the scope of the phrase "relate to." The ERISA Im-
provements Act may settle some of the controversies over preemption
of state insurance and domestic relations laws, but the Act fails to clar-
ify the meaning of "relate to" in any way that would be of value in
other areas of state law.
In the absence of a statutory exemption, it is impossible to predict the
courts' treatment of the relationship between a state law and ERISA
plans under section 514. A useful approach to this confusion, however,
is to examine the state law in light of the proximity and legislative pur-
pose theories outlined in this Note and the judicial presumption against
161. See note 16 supra.
162. 125 CONG. REC. 5575 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979). The 1978 Amendment to The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)),
includes pregnancy coverage in employment-related benefits programs.
163. 125 CONG. REc. S575 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1979).
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preemption in areas of state concern. When ERISA is ambiguous, the
courts will likely continue to be receptive to arguments that a state law
does not "relate to" plans if it affects them only indirectly, if it is consis-
tent with some national legislative policy, or if it furthers an important
and traditional state interest.
Stephen A. Snodgrass
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